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The hybrid structure of the EPPO and its strong links to the national 
legal order raise many questions. One of these is the possibility for 
EPPO cases to reach the European Court of Human Rights via the role 
envisaged for national law and national authorities in future EPPO 
cases. This paper analyses the possibilities of certain EPPO cases 
being subject to review before the European Court of Human Rights 
and the avenues that could lead to such an outcome.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing 
enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecu-
tor’s Office (hereinafter: the Regulation) is the culmination of years of work 
and discussion on the idea of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office1 (herein-
after: EPPO). The adopted Regulation continues to be controversial and a sub-
ject of detailed academic debate. 
Considering that the idea of the EPPO is one of a supranational, European 
prosecution body, the human rights issue is at the forefront of the debate. Given 
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1 See in detail in: A. Novokmet, “The European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Judi-






 Received on 12 May 2019
 Original scientific paper
166
M. Konforta: The European Public Prosecutor’s Office from the Perspective of the European Court of...
Hrvatski ljetopis za kaznene znanosti i praksu (Zagreb), vol. 27, broj 1/2020, str. 165-185.
its investigative and prosecutorial function,2 the EPPO will significantly inter-
vene in fundamental rights and freedoms and will make an impact on them. 
Aside from the human rights issues that habitually arise when discussing a 
prosecution body, the human rights issues are even more highlighted with 
respect to the EPPO because of its novelty, its European Union character, the 
complexity of its structure, as well as other intricacies of its normative frame-
work arising from the Regulation itself. 
The EPPO comes into being in a landscape in which multiple actors are 
already involved in human rights protection, both procedurally and substan-
tively. It is a landscape characterised by interplay and varying levels of mutual 
influence between the actors. International, regional and domestic mechanisms 
can be identified.3 Thus, the human rights question with respect to the EPPO 
can be analysed from multiple points of view. 
This contribution attempts to shine light on the perspective of the European 
Court of Human Rights (hereinafter: the Court) on the EPPO. Its focus is the 
possibility of the EPPO’s actions coming under the scrutiny of the Court in 
proceedings instituted before the Court by an individual alleging violation of 
his or her rights under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter: the Convention). Where does this possi-
bility arise from? The question of a European Union body – the EPPO – com-
ing under the scrutiny of the Court arises from the complexity of the EPPO’s 
design, often described as “hybrid” and “double hat”.4 Specifically, the role of 
national law and, most importantly, of national courts, is key to answering the 
question of the Court’s scrutiny over the EPPO and its cases.
In discussing the issue, reasons for the need to look at the Court`s perspec-
tive on the EPPO will be clarified and two key facets of the Court`s perspective 
indicated. The Court`s current viewpoint regarding the Union and its law will 
be presented, followed by its application on the EPPO as it arises from the 
Regulation. Finally, possible avenues for the EPPO’s actions to be the subject 
of Convention proceedings will be discussed. These avenues will focus on the 
connection between EPPO cases and Member States that open the possibility 
of EPPO cases being scrutinised before the Court.
2 Ibid.
3 To name a few, the United Nations and bodies under its auspices, the European Union 
and its bodies, national jurisdictions and national bodies, the Council of Europe, the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights as established by the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
4 A. Met-Domestici, “The Hybrid Architecture of the EPPO: From the Commission’s Pro-
posal to the Final Act” (2017) 3 eucrim, pp 143-148, p 144. Also, H.-H. Herrnfeld, “The EPPO’s 
Hybrid Structure and Legal Framework: Issues of Implementation – A Perspective from Ger-
many” (2018) 2 eucrim, pp 117-120.
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2. TWO MAIN FACETS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS’ PERSPECTIVE ON THE EPPO
2.1. First facet or the substantive dimension
Regarding the Court’s perspective on the EPPO, two main facets can be 
identified. The first is a substantive one. It is the view that covers the role of the 
rights and freedoms, as guaranteed by the Convention and interpreted by the 
Court, in the functioning of the EPPO and in the EPPO`s pursuit of efficient 
investigation and prosecution of offences affecting the financial interests of the 
Union. Thus, it covers the question of the substantive respect of Convention 
rights by the EPPO itself, as well as the more general question of respect of 
those rights in criminal proceedings in which the EPPO acts. The second and 
more general question reflects the possibility of human rights issues arising in 
proceedings in which the EPPO has exercised its function, even though the 
breach itself may not necessarily be attributed directly to the EPPO, or the 
breach is not the result of any deficiencies in the Regulation. 
Speaking of guaranteeing the protection of fundamental rights by the 
EPPO, the Regulation stipulates that the EPPO shall ensure that its activities 
respect the rights enshrined in the Charter.5 It also provides that the activities 
of the EPPO shall be carried out in full compliance with the rights of suspects 
and accused persons enshrined in the Charter, including the right to a fair trial 
and the rights of defence.6 The procedural rights of suspects and accused per-
sons are guaranteed as provided by the EU’s procedural rights directives.7 The 
Regulation therefore contains provisions on human rights protection which are 
explicitly and understandably linked to EU law. However, the previously men-
tioned procedural rights directives are to a large extent the codified case law of 
5 Article 5(1) of the Regulation. For the applicability of the Charter on EPPO proceedings, 
see V. Mitsilegas and F. Giuffrida, “The European Public Prosecutor’s Office and Human 
Rights” in Geelhoed, Erkelens, Meij (eds), Shifting Perspectives on the European, Public Pros-
ecutor’s Office (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2018) pp 59-99, pp 61-66.
6 Article 41 of the Regulation.
7 For the procedural rights directives and the Convention standards in the area covered by 
them, see: E. Ivičević Karas, Z. Burić, M. Bonačić, “Unapređenje procesnih prava osumnjiče-
nika i okrivljenika u kaznenom postupku: pogled kroz prizmu europskih pravnih standarda” 
(2016) 23(1) Hrvatski ljetopis za kaznene znanosti i praksu, pp 11-58.
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the Court,8 with some notable improvements.9 It must also be noted that the 
directives are implemented in national law with varying degrees of success, 
depending on the State. The solutions adopted at the national level are open to 
criticism,10 as are the differences that exist in implementation in various Mem-
ber States,11 even though there are common minimum rules.
Moreover, it should be borne in mind that fundamental rights, as guaran-
teed by the Convention and as they result from the constitutional traditions of 
Member States, constitute general principles of the Union’s law.12 Insofar as 
the Charter on Fundamental Rights contains rights which correspond to rights 
guaranteed by the Convention, the meaning and scope of these Charter rights 
should be the same as those laid down by the Convention.13 Mitsilegas and 
Giuffrida state that nevertheless “an explicit reference to the ECHR would 
have been welcome”14 in the Regulation. One can agree with this statement. 
Thus, for Charter rights corresponding to Convention rights, the case law of 
the Court is crucial. For example, Article 48 of the Charter corresponds to Arti-
cles 6(2) and 6(3) of the Convention.15 Essentially, its meaning and scope should 
therefore be the same as the rights under Article 6(2) and 6(3) of the Convention 
as they arise from the Court’s case law. Despite its at times problematic rela-
8 Đurđević states this in referring to the right of access to a lawyer. See Z. Đurđević, “The 
Directive on the Right of Access to a Lawyer in Criminal Proceedings: Filling a Human Rights 
Gap in the European Union Legal Order” in Đurđević, Ivičević Karas (eds), European Crim-
inal Procedure Law in Service of Protection of European Union Financial Interests: State of 
Play and Challenges (Croatian Association of European Criminal Law 2016) p 20. 
For the right to information in criminal proceedings, see S. Allegrezza and V. Covolo V, 
“The Directive 2012/13/EU on the Right to Information in Criminal Proceedings: Status Quo 
or Step Forward?” in Đurđević, Ivičević Karas (eds), European Criminal Procedure Law in 
Service of Protection of European Union Financial Interests: State of Play and Challenges 
(Croatian Association of European Criminal Law 2016) pp 49-50.
9 For example, Directive (EU) 2016/1919 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 October 2016 contains provision on the quality of legal aid and training (Article 7).
10 See A. Novokmet, “The Europeanization of the Criminal Proceedings in the Repub-
lic of Croatia through the Implementation of the Directive 2013/48/EU” (2019) 27 European 
Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, pp 97-125. The author refers to the 
effects and perception of the implementation of Directive 2013/48/EU in Croatian criminal 
procedure and criticises some domestic legal solutions whilst offering a different approach.
11 Similarly for issues arising from the differing national transposition of directives and 
human rights issues arising from the structure of the Regulation, see G. Illuminati, “Protec-
tion of Fundamental Rights of the Suspect or Accused in Transnational Proceedings Under 
the EPPO” in Bachmaier Winter Lorena (ed.), The European Public Prosecutor’s Office: The 
Challenges Ahead (Springer Nature 2018) pp 184, 195.
12 Article 6 (3) of the Treaty on European Union.
13 Article 52 (3) of the Charter on Fundamental Rights.
14 Mitsilegas and Giuffrida (n 5) p 66.
15 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C 303/02.
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tionship with the Strasbourg Court, this basic principle is confirmed in the 
Court of Justice’s case law.16 Convention standards are in fact a minimum 
standard below which the protection provided by Union law should not go.17 
2.1.1. Interference with specific Convention rights 
Turning back to the EPPO and specific Convention rights that might come 
into play in its work, those rights include, but are not limited to, respect of 
rights guaranteed under Articles 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of 
Protocol no. 1 to the Convention. The EPPO can interfere with these rights. 
Other bodies working in EPPO proceedings, such as national law enforcement, 
can interfere with these rights.18 However, the question of concrete interference 
itself is separate and should not be mistaken for the attribution of responsibil-
ity under the Convention framework (see infra under 3).
A thorough analysis of all the possible actions of the EPPO that could inter-
fere with human rights as guaranteed by the Convention, and all the human 
rights issues that could arise in EPPO-led cases, exceeds the limits of this 
contribution, but a presentation of such actions is given for a more complete 
understanding of the Court`s perspective.
Article 30 of the Regulation regulates the investigation measures available 
to the EPPO, stipulating six groups of investigation measures the European 
Delegated Prosecutors should be entitled to order or request, in addition to 
other measures in Member States available to prosecutors under national law 
in similar national cases.19 The Regulation in Article 30(2) to 30(5) provides 
for express safeguards for individuals, specific to investigation measures. With 
respect to safeguards, conditions and limitations to investigation measures, it 
essentially refers back to national law. It stipulates in paragraph (5) that Euro-
pean Delegated Prosecutors “may only order the measures referred to in para-
graphs 1 and 4 where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the specific 
measure in question might provide information or evidence useful to the inves-
tigation, and where there is no less intrusive measure available which could 
16 See judgment in Case C-612/15 of 5 June 2018 (Kolev and Others) §§ 103-106.
17 Article 52(3) of the Charter on Fundamental Rights, second sentence.
18 See The European Public Prosecutor’s Office: Strategies for Coping with Complexity 
(Study requested by the CONT Committee) p 90, available at: https://www.europarl.europa.
eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/621806/IPOL_STU(2019)621806_EN.pdf (30 September 2019).
19 Article 31(1) and (5) of the Regulation. Member States shall ensure that the European 
Delegated Prosecutors are entitled to order or request the enumerated investigation measures 
at least in cases where the offence subject to the investigation is punishable by a maximum 
penalty of at least 4 years of imprisonment.
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achieve the same objective”. However, the procedures and modalities for tak-
ing the measures again refer to national law. 
All the measures enumerated in Article 30(1) (a)-(c) and (e)-(f) interfere with 
the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence as guar-
anteed in Article 8 of the Convention.20 Generally, interference with Article 8 
rights must be “in accordance with the law”, referring not only to a legal basis but 
also to the quality of law. In the case law of the Court, written, statutory “law” is 
defined as “the enactment in force as the competent courts have interpreted it”.21 
The interference must further pursue a “legitimate aim” and it must be “neces-
sary in a democratic society”. The Court̀ s case law places emphasis on sufficient 
and effective safeguards that must be afforded to the individual in question, be it 
a physical or legal person.22 These safeguards must be effective not only as a 
normative solution but must operate effectively in the concrete circumstances of 
a particular case.23 Judicial control24 is of the utmost importance, meaning that 
automatic and superficial judicial scrutiny is insufficient.25 
For example, the search of premises, transport, private homes, property, 
computer systems, etc., under Article 30(1)(a) of the Regulation interferes with 
the right to respect for private life and home and should thus comply with the 
above requirements. When allegations of unlawful searches arise, for example, 
an effective investigation into those allegations might also be required under 
the Convention.26 Furthermore, depending on the manner of execution of the 
search of any type of premises or buildings, the investigation measure might 
also interfere with Convention rights under Article 3 – the accused persoǹ s 
rights or those of third persons27 (such as an overly violent and intrusive search 
affecting the people found on the premises). 
Furthermore, although the issue of admissibility of evidence does not in 
principle fall under the Court`s scrutiny, the use of evidence obtained in breach 
20 For investigation measures in the context of Charter rights, see J. Inghelram, “Search 
and Seizure Measures and their Review” in Erkelens, Meij, Pawlik (eds), The European Pub-
lic Prosecutor’s Office: An Extended Arm or a Two-Headed Dragon (Asser Press, 2015) pp 
128-129.
21 See K.S. and M.S. v Germany, judgment, 33696/11, 06 October 2016, § 34.
22 See Saint-Paul Luxembourg S.A. v Luxembourg, judgment, 26419/10, 18 April 2013. 
23 See Iliya Stefanov v Bulgaria, judgment, 65755/01, 22 May 2008, § 38.
24 For types of judicial control, see Z. Đurđević, “Judicial Control in Pre-Trial Criminal 
Procedure Conducted by the European Public Prosecutor” in K. Ligeti, Toward a Prosecutor for 
the European Union, Volume 1, A Comparative Analysis (Hart Publishing, 2013) pp 986-911. 
25 For the level of scrutiny before the Court depending on the type of judicial control in 
the context of a search, see Harju v Finland, judgment, 56716/09, 15 February 2011, §§ 42-46. 
For superficial and inadequately reasoned judicial orders for secret surveillance, see Bosak and 
Others v Croatia, judgment, 40429/14 et al., 6 June 2019, § 45.
26 See Vasylchuk v Ukraine, judgment, 24402/07, 13 June 2013, § 84. 
27 See Gutsanovi v Bulgaria, judgment, 34529/10, 15 October 2013, §§ 125-137.
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of Convention rights might affect the fairness of the trial as a whole28 and thus 
lead to a violation of Article 6 of the Convention. Therefore, the use in criminal 
proceedings of evidence obtained by undertaking measures enumerated in 
Article 30(1) of the Regulation might raise a fair trial issue.
The freezing of instrumentalities or proceeds of crime, including assets, 
under Article 30(1)(d), interferes with the right to peaceful enjoyment of pos-
sessions under Article 1 of Protocol no 1 to the Convention.29 However, even 
seizing computers containing data could raise issues under Article 1 of Proto-
col no 1 to the Convention. In addition to potentially breaching the right to a 
trial within a reasonable time, protracted proceedings in EPPO cases risk fur-
ther breaches of Convention rights. Measures that include the freezing of 
assets, confiscation, conservatory measures limiting access to any kind of pos-
sessions or property and that last too long risk falling foul of Article 1 of Pro-
tocol no 1 to the Convention.30 
Further, under Article 33 of the Regulation, the handling European Dele-
gated Prosecutor (hereinafter: EDP) may order or request the arrest or pre-trial 
detention of the suspect or accused person in accordance with the national law 
applicable in similar domestic cases. This authority given to the handling EDP 
means that actions of the EPPO, depending on the national law, will lead to 
interference with the right to liberty and security. Therefore, all the considera-
ble case law of the Court under Article 5 of the Convention must be observed. 
As it stands, the Regulation itself provides for no express prerequisites for 
ordering or requesting arrest or detention.31 Given the central importance of 
the right at issue and the ambiguity of the Regulation, i.e. its reference back to 
national law, implementation measures in Member States and the national law 
will be responsible for ensuring Convention compliant, sufficiently precise, 
legal norms. Essentially, the States will bear, through the national law, signifi-
cant responsibility, although the EPPO remains the body “ordering or request-
ing the arrest or pre-trial detention”. This ambiguity of the Regulation and the 
space left to national law also means that it is currently hard to delineate the 
extent to which the EPPO itself will act in particular situations, as well as its 
28 The Court examines whether the proceedings as a whole were fair, which includes the 
way in which the evidence was obtained. In case of breaches of Article 8 of the Convention, 
the accused must have the opportunity to oppose the use of evidence so obtained and to dispute 
its authenticity; the quality of the evidence is taken into consideration. See Dragojević v Cro-
atia, judgment, 68955/11, 15 January 2015, §§ 127-135, for evidence obtained through secret 
surveillance in breach of Article 8, but not falling foul of Article 6 of the Convention. Different 
standards apply to evidence obtained in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. 
29 See Džinić v Croatia, judgment, 38359/13, 17 May 2016.
30 Regarding the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions, see also Article 38 of the Regu-
lation. For case law, see, for example, Vuković v Croatia, judgment, 47880/14, 15 November 2018.
31 For the scope of rights of suspects and accused persons, see Article 41 of the Regulation.
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manner. The possible interferences with Convention rights arising from the 
EPPO`s work do not end with the above, as the decision to dismiss a case might 
also raise questions of the rights of victims of crime,32 while issues on the 
choice of forum in EPPO cases might raise questions under Article 7 of the 
Convention.33
As shown, the question of whether the EPPO’s actions as they stem from 
the Regulation would be compliant with Convention rights as the Court inter-
preted them, or whether they would fall short of applicable standards, is a 
complex one. A large number of very specific questions arise from the text of 
the Regulation itself, but not enough clear and detailed answers can be found 
in the text, given the importance of the institution of the EPPO and the sensi-
tive area it interferes with.34 In fact, at important points, the Regulation refers 
to national law. The substantive perspective and the wide issue of respect of 
human rights have been the subject of academic debate35 and, given all the 
above, these will certainly continue to be important topics in discussions on 
the EPPO.
2.1.2. The second facet or the procedural dimension
The second facet, and the main focus of this contribution, is the possibility 
of the EPPO’s actions coming under the scrutiny of the European Court of 
Human Rights in proceedings instituted before that Court by an individual 
alleging a violation of his or her Convention rights. It has been stated that the 
EPPO interferes with human rights. This is not in doubt. However, can a sus-
pect, an accused or a victim of a crime36 lodge an application before the Court 
in connection with an EPPO-led case without that application being declared 
32 Article 39 of the Regulation.
33 Compare Seychell v Malta, judgment, 43328/14, 28 August 2018, in which the applicant 
was unable to know which court he would be tried before and what consequences his actions 
could entail, owing to the discretion of the State Attorney as to the choice of court, and lead-
ing to a violation of Article 7 of the Convention; and similarly Camilleri v Malta, judgment, 
42931/10, 22 January 2013.
34 As to choice of forum, see, for example, Michele Panzavolta, “Choosing the National 
Forum in Proceedings Conducted by the EPPO: Who Is to Decide?” in Lorena Bachmaier 
Winter (ed), The European Public Prosecutor’s Office: The Challenges Ahead (Springer 
Nature 2018) pp 82-83.
35 For example, see an extensive analysis by Mitsilegas and Giuffrida (n 5) pp 59-99.
36 All those enumerated – the suspect, accused, victim of crime – must be able to claim 
the status of “victim” of a violation of a Convention right in order for an application to be 
admissible. A victim of a violation of a Convention right is also an appropriate term once the 
Court finds a violation by a judgment. Thus, one needs to use the term victim with clarity and 
precision in order to avoid confusion.
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inadmissible? If so, what would be the (procedural) path for such an applica-
tion, under which conditions would this be possible, and in which situations? 
This can be described as a procedural issue. The origin of this issue and the 
key to clarifying it lie in the significant role given to national courts in EPPO 
proceedings. Thus, the answer is not a clear-cut “no”. 
An analysis of the Court`s perspective is necessary given that all EU Mem-
ber States participating in the enhanced cooperation are subjected to the Con-
vention and the Court’s supervision concerning respect of Convention rights. 
Convention rights and the Court’s case law also play an important role within 
the framework of EU law, as sketched above. Applications against States that 
participate in the EPPO’s establishment are normally lodged with the Court. 
The cases against those EU States increasingly touch upon EU law, as will be 
shown below. At the same time, the Regulation, despite establishing the EPPO 
as an EU body, nonetheless leaves the door open to interpretation when it 
comes to the possible activation of the Court’s jurisdiction via the actions and 
decision of national bodies.
3. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS’ CASE LAW 
RELEVANT TO THE PROCEDURAL FACET 
3.1. Admissibility questions 
Every High Contracting Party to the Convention undertook to secure Con-
vention rights for everyone within their jurisdiction,37 with the Court estab-
lished as the guardian and supervisor.38 The Court may receive applications 
from any person, nongovernmental organisation or group of individuals claim-
ing to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the 
rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto.39 The Court’s juris-
diction extends to all matters concerning the interpretation and application of 
the Convention, with the Court having the last say in the event of a dispute.40 
In setting the admissibility criteria, the Convention provides for, inter alia, 
time limits, exhaustion of domestic remedies, and that the Court shall declare 
inadmissible any individual application submitted under Article 34 if it consid-
ers that the application is incompatible with the provisions of the Convention 
or the Protocols thereto.41 
37 Article 1 of the Convention. 
38 Article 19 of the Convention. 
39 Article 34 of the Convention.
40 Article 32 of the Convention.
41 Article 35 of the Convention.
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In order for an application to be admissible, it must, inter alia, be lodged 
against a Member State, lodged within the six-month time limit after a final 
decision was taken, lodged by a Convention-recognised petitioner claiming to 
be a victim of a violation of a Convention right, and lodged after all available 
and efficient domestic remedies were exhausted.42 The application must be 
admissible under all grounds related to the Court’s jurisdiction (admissibility 
ratione personae, ratione loci, ratione temporis, ratione materiae)43 and under 
the so-called merits based grounds.44 
The admissibility criteria, although in the Court’s case law much more 
nuanced, complex and casuistic than the above would suggest, is a baseline for 
the consideration of possible avenues for EPPO related cases to reach the mer-
its stage. 
3.2. The Court’s position towards the European Union and its law45
Turning to the European Union, as a non-member of the Convention it can-
not be a respondent before the Court. Applications lodged against all EU 
Members but aimed directly at the Union or its acts are inadmissible ratione 
personae. Applications essentially directed against decisions of EU bodies fall 
outside the Court’s jurisdiction. These applications are declared inadmissible. 
In order for a complaint to fall within the Court’s jurisdiction, there must be an 
act or an omission that can be attributed to the Member States. 
Bearing the above in mind, today the relationship of the Court towards the 
European Union and its law is generally defined through the presumption of 
equivalent protection. 
The basis underpinning this relationship is the understanding that a State 
which concludes a treaty assuming certain obligations, after which it concludes 
a second treaty preventing it from discharging its obligations under the first 
treaty, will be answerable under the first treaty.46 This principle applies a for-
tiori when the first treaty affects the public order of Europe, as the Convention 
does, and thus the (partial) transfer of sovereignty from a State does not absolve 
42 See in detail in the Court’s admissibility guide, available at: https://www.echr.coe.int/
Documents/Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf (30 September 2019).
43 Ibid., pp 47-58.
44 Ibid., pp 61-78.
45 The author wrote in detail on the issue of European Union law in the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights. This part of the contribution draws on that article and is 
partly based on it, although updated and modified. See M. Konforta, “Pravo Europske unije 
u praksi Europskog suda za ljudska prava s posebnim osvrtom na europski uhidbeni nalog” 
(2018) 25(1) Hrvatski ljetopis za kaznene znanosti i praksu, pp 65-97.
46 X. v Germany, 235/56, 10 June 1956, and Etienne Tête v France, decision 11123/84, 
quoting the decision in Austria v Italy, 788/60, 11 January 1961.
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the State of its obligations under the Convention.47 The Court emphasised that 
a State “is responsible under Article 1 of the Convention for all acts and omis-
sions of its organs regardless of whether the act or omission in question was a 
consequence of domestic law or of the necessity to comply with international 
legal obligations. Article 1 makes no distinction as to the type of rule or meas-
ure concerned and does not exclude any part of a Contracting Party’s ‘jurisdic-
tion’ from scrutiny under the Convention”.48 The presumption of equivalent 
protection and its prerequisites were detailed in the Bosphorus judgment49 ren-
dered in 2005 and later developed in Michaud v France,50 M.S.S. v Belgium 
and Greece,51 and Avotiņš v Latvia.52
In short, State action taken in compliance with legal obligations flowing 
from Union law is justified as long as the Union is considered to protect funda-
mental rights in a manner equivalent to the Convention.53 The equivalency of 
protection encompasses both the substantive guarantees and the mechanisms 
controlling their observance.54 The Court has explicitly held that equivalent 
does not mean identical, but comparable.55 The Union, formerly the Commu-
nity, was held to provide such protection due to the role and position of human 
rights in its legal order, the position and protection of the Court of Justice, the 
respect for Union law secured through the Commission’s competence and 
actions, and the dialogue between national courts and the Court of Justice.56 
The presumption is applicable only if the State was merely following its 
strict international, or, in this case, Union obligation.57 It is applicable if the 
State had no margin for a different action but had to take the impugned action 
(the so-called “margin for manoeuvre” condition), and the full spectrum of the 
Union’s protection mechanisms was applied.58 The presumption will be 
rebutted if the protection of Convention rights is manifestly deficient in the 
particular case.59
47 Etienne Tête v France, decision, 11123/84, 9 December 1987.
48 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland, Grand Chamber 
judgment, 45036/98, 30 June 2005 (hereinafter: Bosphorus judgment).
49 Ibid. 
50 Michaud v France, 12323/11, judgment of 6 December 2012 (hereinafter: Michaud 
judgment).
51 M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, 30696/09, judgment of 21 January 2011 (hereinafter: 
M.S.S judgment).
52 Avotiņš v Latvia, 17502/07, Grand Chamber judgment of 23 May 2016 (hereinafter: 
Avotiņš judgment).
53 Bosphorus judgment, § 155.
54 Bosphorus judgment, § 155.
55 Bosphorus judgment, § 155.
56 Michaud judgment, §§ 106-111. Konforta (n 45) pp 70-71.
57 Bosphorus judgment, §§ 156-157.
58 Konforta (n 45) p 71. Bosphorus judgment, §§ 156-157. Avotiņš judgment, § 105.
59 Bosphorus judgment, § 156.
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A prime example of the application of the presumption and the indication 
of possible issues to arise for the EPPO in connection with the “margin for 
manoeuvre” condition is the M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece judgment. The 
Court considered that under “the Dublin Regulation, the Belgian authorities 
could have refrained from transferring the applicant if they had considered that 
the receiving country, namely Greece, was not fulfilling its obligations under 
the Convention. Consequently… the impugned measure taken by the Belgian 
authorities did not strictly fall within Belgium’s international legal obliga-
tions”.60 Therefore, the specific State behaviour disputed before the Court was 
not in fact a strict legal obligation.
Procedurally, the mentioned EU law cases were brought against Member 
States, alleging that certain measures of the respondent Member State, com-
mitted by a Member State body, violated Convention rights. Therefore, through 
the Member State’s application of EU law, EU law and the activities of EU 
institutions indirectly come under the scrutiny of the Court. 
The crux of the matter in relation to the EPPO is: (i) whether its actions can 
be attributed to Member States in order to attract the Court’s jurisdiction, and 
(ii) can actions of Member States (in reality, actions of their bodies) be consid-
ered a fulfilment of strict obligation flowing from EU law, thus meeting the 
first condition of the presumption? Firstly, to establish the Court’s jurisdiction, 
there must be State action – action of State organs. If there is no such action, 
but the impugned measure is one of an EU body, the application would be 
inadmissible.61 Secondly, in order for the presumption to be activated, State 
action must be an expression of a strict EU obligation, and the State must not 
have had a margin for manoeuvre. Although the Court has examined the issue 
of the presumption in admissibility decisions,62 at the merits stage63 and in a 
special section of the judgment called responsibility of the State,64 the main 
issues in the EPPO context remain the same. For the EPPO and the possible 
review of its cases before the Court, the key question remains that of impugned 
measures that can be attributed to the State. The EPPO being an EU body, 
logic would seemingly dictate that its actions fall outside the Court’s jurisdic-
tion and are not attributable to Member States. The situation is, however, not as 
clear cut as it might appear.
60 M.S.S. judgment, § 340.
61 Cooperatieve Producentenorganisatie Van De Nederlandse Kokkelvisserij U.A. v Neth-
erland, decision, 13645/05, 20 January 2009.
62 See Povse v Austria, decision, 3890/11, 18 June 2013.
63 Avotiņš judgment (n 52).
64 M.S.S. judgment, §§ 338-340. 
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3.3. Possible application in relation to the EPPO 
The EPPO is without question a body of the European Union, with legal 
personality.65 Structurally, the EPPO is organised at a central and at a decen-
tralised level. It is often referred to as having a hybrid structure – both supra-
national and national.66 The EPPO remains an EU body even when acting 
through its decentralised level and notwithstanding the “double hat” function 
of the European delegated prosecutors.67 It is the body of a non-member to the 
Convention. As such, and as with all other EU bodies, its actions should not 
fall under the Court’s scrutiny. 
Firstly, as a body, and not a subject under international law, its actions can-
not directly be the subject of the Court’s scrutiny. In this respect, the Union’s 
membership of the Convention is irrelevant. A body cannot be a respondent 
before the Court. However, as indicated previously, the issue is to whom the 
EPPO’s actions are attributable. As a body of the Union, the EPPO’s actions 
are attributed to the Union. But the Union is not a Convention member. There-
fore, to the extent that the EPPO’s actions are attributed exclusively to the 
Union, there would be no circumventing the fact that the Union did not accede 
to the Convention and cannot answer for the actions of its bodies before the 
Court. In the event of the accession of the Union to the Convention, an appli-
cation could be lodged against the Union alleging a violation of Convention 
rights committed by the EPPO as a Union body. 
What other possible situation exists for a case, stemming from the EPPO’s 
actions, to come before the Court? The answer lies in the EPPO’s hybrid struc-
ture, specifically in the role of national courts and national law. Essentially, the 
answer is in possible applications against particular Member States which, 
through their bodies, most notably the courts, interfered with individual Con-
vention rights, such as the rights under Articles 3, 5, 6 or 8, for example. 
The interwoven elements opening the door to the Court’s supervision over 
EPPO cases can be summarised in the following: a) national law; b) national 
courts and national bodies; c) judicial review. The combined effect of these 
65 Article 3 of the EPPO Regulation.
66 See Z. Đurđević, “Legislative or Regulatory Modifications to Be Introduced in Partici-
pant Member States to the Enhanced Cooperation, in International Conference on Enhanced 
Cooperation for the Establishment of the EPPO, Rome 24-25 May 2018, pp 101-102.
67 Luchtman and Vervaele state that although “the legal consequences of EPPO activity 
are ultimately felt within the legal orders of the Member States, the fact remains that the 
EPPO is a European body, which is entrusted with a series of tasks that – by their very defi-
nition – cannot be clearly attributed to a single Member State”. M. Luchtman and J. Vervaele, 
‘European Agencies for Criminal Justice and Shared Enforcement (Eurojust and the European 
Public Prosecutor’s Office)’ (2014) 10(5) Utrecht Law Review, 144.
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factors provides a strong argument for a future review of EPPO cases before 
the Court.
Firstly, national law applies to the extent that a matter is not regulated by 
the EPPO Regulation.68 Specifically, and unless otherwise specified in the 
Regulation, the applicable national law is the law of the Member State whose 
European Delegated Prosecutor is handling the case.69 The EPPO is a Union 
body even when applying national law. However, the extensive embeddedness 
of the national legal framework in the Regulation, the expression and effect of 
the inter-governmental model for the establishment of the EPPO, weakens the 
supranational element, the EU element. It weakens the EU nature of the EPPO, 
which is what keeps it from the Court’s scrutiny. 
In fact, many key questions are referred back to national law, most impor-
tantly national procedural law.70 To mention a few, “the handling European 
Delegated Prosecutor may order or request the arrest or pre-trial detention of 
the suspect or accused person in accordance with the national law applicable 
in similar domestic cases”,71 rules on investigation measures and other meas-
ures, and Article 28 referring to conducting the investigation. It also bears 
mentioning that the EPPO shall be competent in respect of criminal offences 
affecting the financial interests of the Union that are provided for in Directive 
(EU) 2017/1371, as implemented by national law.72
Therefore, national law plays an important role in the designed future func-
tioning of the EPPO, whether national law as it currently exists or future 
national law.73 This is a link to national, State, legal systems. It is a strong link.
The role given to national authorities by the Regulation is essential. Prose-
cution is to be conducted before the national courts.74 Trials are to be before 
the national courts, applying national procedural rules. The fact that the 
national legal order is so interwoven in the EPPO Regulation means that 
national authorities will be included in EPPO cases. This, in turn, leads to a 
Member State’s action or omission via its authorities possibly triggering Con-
vention responsibility.
Generally, when the implementation and application of EU law is in play, 
the State most often has a sufficient margin for its actions. The EPPO Regula-
tion and the Directive (EU) 2017/1371 are no different. They do not impose 
such strict obligations on the national legal system and national authorities so 
68 Article 5 of the EPPO Regulation.
69 Herrnfeld (n 4) p 119. Article 5 of the EPPO Regulation.
70 Herrnfeld (n 4) p 119.
71 Article 33 of the EPPO Regulation.
72 Article 22 of the EPPO Regulation.
73 Herrnfeld (n 4) p 119.
74 Article 36 of the EPPO Regulation.
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as to fall under the presumption of equivalent protection. It cannot be said that 
the EPPO Regulation imposes on Member States and their bodies an obliga-
tion so strict that the domestic authorities would have no choice in their deci-
sion-making. There is nothing automatic in the role given to national courts by 
the Regulation. In the decision Povse v Austria, the Court held that the Aus-
trian courts did no more than implement their obligation under Union law.75 
Such restriction and automatism in national decision-making does not stem 
from the EPPO Regulation. On the contrary, the M.S.S. judgment76 shows a 
more likely path for the Court’s consideration. 
In EPPO cases, a judgment shall be rendered by a national court following 
criminal proceedings conducted under national procedural law, with the pros-
ecutor being the EPPO, i.e. a Union body. This raises the issue of possible 
applications to the Court against a particular Member State, complaining about 
the fairness of such criminal proceedings. When a judgment on guilt is pro-
nounced by a national court, the road is open to Strasbourg. An individual 
disputes a national judgment, rendered by a national court, following a proce-
dure conducted under national procedural law, just as in other Court cases with 
an EU connection. Provided he or she complies with so-called regular admis-
sibility conditions, an inadmissibility decision or triggering the presumption of 
equivalent protection seems unlikely.
Furthermore, the investigation measures and other measures envisaged by 
the Regulation provide that the procedures and modalities for taking measures 
shall be governed by the applicable national law, despite some conditions 
established by the Regulation for requesting or ordering such measures.77 
The issue of judicial review is a further element corroborating the possibil-
ity of an EPPO case being brought and reviewed before the Court. Procedural 
acts of the EPPO that are intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third par-
ties are subject to review by the competent national courts in accordance with 
the requirements and procedures laid down by national law.78 The same applies 
to failures of the EPPO to adopt procedural acts which are intended to produce 
legal effects vis-à-vis third parties and whose adoption was legally required 
under this Regulation.79 This provision is an argument for future Strasbourg 
cases due – again – to a strong Member State link. 
However, one should be careful of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in 
conducting judicial review as specified in Article 42, as the judicial review was 
in fact divided between national courts and the Court of Justice. It should be 
75 Povse v Austria decision (n 62) para 82.
76 See note 53 above, the M.S.S. judgment, §§ 338-340.
77 See Article 30 of the EPPO Regulation.
78 See Article 42 of the EPPO Regulation.
79 Article 42 of the EPPO Regulation.
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noted that from a Strasbourg perspective the Court of Justice jurisdiction 
(Article 42(2) of the Regulation), generally and by itself, does not exclude a 
possible Strasbourg case, where a domestic court’s decision follows the pre-
liminary ruling, as can be seen in the Bosphorus judgment. Moreover, one 
should mention the Court’s case of O’Sullivan McCarthy Mussel Development 
Ltd v. Ireland.80 In that case, the Court found that “[w]hile it was therefore clear 
that the respondent State had to comply with the directive and, with immedi-
acy, the CJEU judgment, both were results to be achieved and neither man-
dated how compliance was to be effected. The respondent State was therefore 
not wholly deprived of a margin of manoeuvre in this respect”.81 The CJEU 
judgment referred to was rendered in EU infringement proceedings against 
Ireland. Also noteworthy is the fact that the conclusion was reached in the 
merits part of the Court’s judgment.
It is further noteworthy that a decision on the dismissal of a case appears to 
be in the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, as stipulated by Article 42(3) of 
the Regulation, although there might be certain confusion due to the wording 
“in so far as they are contested directly on the basis of Union law”. Addition-
ally, the Court of Justice is competent for the compensation of damages in 
accordance with Article 268 TFEU. The basic principle from the Court’s per-
spective is that where judicial review ends with the Court of Justice, there is no 
procedural link to the national legal system which would enable a case to be 
reviewed before the Strasbourg Court. The impugned measure remains within 
the EU legal order and does not have an avenue to reach the Court when judi-
cial review of a measure interfering with Convention rights ends with the 
Court of Justice.
The issue of judicial review and its split between the national courts and the 
Court of Justice has already been the subject of significant criticism and it is 
argued that judicial control over acts of a Union body should be left to a Union 
body.82 Böse states that the “Union courts are competent for judicial review on 
the basis of Union law whereas review on the basis of national law falls within 
the exclusive competence of national courts”.83 The author goes on to elaborate 
that the idea of shared judicial review ignores the interaction between Union 
law and national law84 and is incompatible with the Treaty system of judicial 
80 O’Sullivan McCarthy Mussel Development Ltd v. Ireland, judgment, 44460/16, 7 June 
2018.
81 Ibid., § 112.
82 See in detail M. Böse, “Judicial Control of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office” in 
T. Raffaraci, R. Belfiore (eds), EU Criminal Justice Fundamental Rights, Transnational Pro-
ceedings and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (Springer, 2019) pp 191-202.
83 Ibid., p. 195.
84 Ibid., p. 195.
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control.85 Nonetheless, the fact remains that the Regulations provides for a 
form of shared judicial control. In areas where judicial review is reserved for 
national courts, the decisions rendered by the national courts in such a process 
are likely to be disputed before the Strasbourg Court.
Aside from Bose’s well-reasoned criticism, shared judicial review could 
lead to a further conflict between the Court and the Convention system on one 
hand, and the Court of Justice and the EU system on the other. This is in addi-
tion to the inevitable confusion and conflict that will, at least in the beginning, 
characterise the interaction between the national system and the EU system 
when it comes to the EPPO. Legal certainty and the coherence of the protec-
tion of fundamental rights do not speak in favour of a result that puts some 
interferences with human rights in EPPO cases under the Court’s jurisdiction 
and others not. Neither is the protection of those rights helped by such frag-
mented protection, by multiple actors at a regional (European) and national 
level.
However, to conclude with the Court’s perspective, and in any event, it is 
hard to imagine a State successfully arguing that it had to undertake a certain 
action in concrete criminal proceedings and that it was bound to do so by the 
Regulation and Union law, which would be one way of avoiding responsibility 
under Union law. It is hard to imagine how State responsibility would not be 
triggered with an EPPO system designed with such reliance on the national 
legal system. If the individual complains that important defence witnesses 
were not heard in an EPPO case trial, how can the State convincingly claim 
that it was merely fulfilling its strict legal obligation? How could the national 
authorities claim that such a decision in a criminal trial was the pure result of 
EPPO actions, of EU body actions? Does the arbitrary reasoning of a criminal 
judgment fall under strict EU obligations? Is ordering a search and seizure of 
the home or the freezing of assets, without basic Convention rights being 
respected, a requirement of EU law? Similarly, the chance of measures includ-
ing a deprivation of liberty escaping Strasbourg’s supervision in EPPO pro-
ceedings are non-existent when the Regulation itself refers back to national 
law and envisages that the requesting or ordering of an arrest or pre-trial 
detention be “in accordance with the national law applicable in similar domes-
tic cases”.86 It is hard to imagine such situations happening in reality. Impor-
tantly, it is hard to imagine coherent and justified reasoning excluding these 
issues from the Court’s scrutiny with the Regulation standing as it is. This is in 
view of the extent to which the impugned measures would be based in national 
law and given that the final decision would in most cases be rendered by a 
purely domestic authority, notably the domestic court. This is not to say that 
85 Ibid., p. 201.
86 Article 33(1) of the Regulation.
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the Convention would be violated, but one can see a way for an EPPO case to 
be admissible before the Court. The examples mentioned are the simplest, 
most straightforward ones. 
However, one different situation could be the actions of domestic law 
enforcement acting under the EPPO’s orders. Depending on the factual cir-
cumstances and the extent of domestic judicial control, the impugned action 
would still be attributed to the EPPO and thus to the EU.87 Therefore, even 
when the action itself is undertaken by national law enforcement if the EPPO 
(and only the EPPO) has full control of it, I believe that specific interference 
would not be subject to the Court`s scrutiny. The connection between the 
national element and the interference would not be of such a nature and strength 
to enable the Court`s supervision.
The main conclusion to be drawn from all the above is the complexity and 
insecurity that remain. As a rule, with respect to human rights in criminal 
cases, this is not desirable or even acceptable.
Therefore, the possible review by the Court of respect for individual rights 
in EPPO cases is not necessarily the desirable or the best option for the coher-
ent protection of human rights at the European level. On the contrary, many 
faults can be found in such an outcome. On the other hand, one cannot deny 
the extensive case law and the comprehensive role of Strasbourg in protecting 
individual rights in criminal cases thus far. Indeed, there is significant value in 
its role. Despite the pros and cons of possible supervision by the Court in 
EPPO cases (there are many of each) such supervision is a possibility that may 
come to pass in reality. 
A desirable outcome would be a fully coherent and structurally sound sys-
tem encompassing the EPPO. 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Court has always been particularly sensitive to criminal law cases, 
which is entirely understandable as these cases go to the core of the Conven-
tion. It is therefore not likely that a case brought before it would be dismissed 
because the prosecution and investigation in the case were under the EPPO’s 
competence (of course, depending on the concrete violation alleged). This, 
however, applies only to cases and instances that include national bodies. 
Where the decision remains with the EPPO, where the actions are completely 
with the EPPO and under its control, and where they remain in the Union legal 
87 See European Public Prosecutor’s Office (n 18) p 90. The study also indicates the fur-
ther possibility for the case to be scrutinised by the Court, i.e. a rethinking of the presumption 
of equivalent protection. 
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order, there can be no road to Strasbourg via the national legal system if there 
is no national link.
The hybrid structure and regulation of the EPPO leaves room for future 
conflicts between Strasbourg and Luxembourg. The complete removal of 
EPPO cases from the Court’s supervision is not likely. The hybrid structure 
and legal framework of the EPPO will, in my opinion, lead to some cases 
being reviewed in Strasbourg due to their link with the national legal system. 
However, a desirable system would be one that is fully coherent and structur-
ally sound, but one which currently does not seem to be on the horizon. The 
desirable system in question is unlikely to arise from the current normative 
framework given the manner in which it connects the national, Convention and 
EU system. Personally, and given the huge contribution of the Court to the 
protection of human rights, I am very reluctant to argue for reaching a coherent 
system by removing the Court from the equation. One of the reasons for my 
reluctance is, in my view, the unique perspective and focus the Court has and 
has built concerning the individual`s rights. However, I cannot deny that the 
complexity that comes with the Regulation and the EPPO`s activity is in itself 
not beneficial to individual rights. And, in that complexity, the Court will also 
have its role.
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Sažetak
URED EUROPSKOG JAVNOG TUŽITELJA IZ PERSPEKTIVE  
EUROPSKOG SUDA ZA LJUDSKA PRAVA
Uredba Vijeća (EU) 2017/1939 od 12. listopada 2017. o provedbi pojačane suradnje u vezi 
s osnivanjem Ureda europskog javnog tužitelja kulminacija je godina rada na ideji europskog 
javnog tužitelja. Uspostavlja Ured EJT-a kao tijelo EU-a s pravnom osobnošću, kojemu je dan 
zadatak istraživanja i progona kaznenih djela koja utječu na financijske interese Unije. Među-
tim Ured EJT-a ima hibridnu strukturu, s vidljivim jakim izrazima tzv. međuvladina modela i 
ima jake veze s nacionalnim pravom. 
Osnivanje Ureda EJT-a otvara pitanje moguće perspektive Europskog suda za ljudska 
prava na taj ured. Navedena perspektiva ima dva aspekta, odnosno dimenzije – materijalnu i 
postupovnu. 
Prvi aspekt obuhvaća ulogu prava i sloboda kako su zajamčeni Konvencijom za zaštitu 
ljudskih prava i tumačeni u praksi Suda, u funkcioniranju Ureda EJT-a i njegovoj težnji za 
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učinkovitom istragom i progonom. Ured EJT-a će se u svojem radu nedvojbeno miješati u 
ljudska prava, kao što su ona zajamčena člancima 3., 5. i 8. Konvencije itd. 
Drugi aspekt obuhvaća mogućnost – postupovni put – da aktivnosti Ured EJT-a dođu pod 
nadzor Suda u postupku koji bi pred njim pokrenuo pojedinac tvrdeći da su mu povrijeđena kon-
vencijska prava. Naime EU, koji nije članica Konvencije, ne može biti tužen pred Sudom. Me-
đutim u temelju je današnjeg odnosa Suda prema EU-u i pravu EU-a presumpcija ekvi valentne 
zaštite, što znači da je aktivnost države koja je u skladu s obvezama koje proizlaze iz prava Unije 
opravdana dok god Unija štiti temeljna prava na način ekvivalentan Konvenciji. Presumpcija je 
primjenjiva ako je država samo ispunjavala svoje stroge obveze prema EU-u i nije imala prostora 
za drukčije postupanje, a bio je primijenjen puni spektar Unijinih zaštitnih mehanizama.
U odnosu na Ured EJT-a bit je u tome: (i) može li se njegovo postupanje pripisati državi 
članici tako da privuče nadležnost Suda te (ii) mogu li se postupci države članice (u stvarno-
sti, postupci njezinih tijela) smatrati ispunjavanjem strogih obveza iz prava EU-a, čime bi bio 
ispunjen prvi uvjet presumpcije. 
Međusobno isprepleteni elementi koji otvaraju put nadzoru Suda nad predmetima Ureda 
EJT-a jesu: a) nacionalno pravo, b) nacionalni sudovi i tijela, c) sudska kontrola. Kombinirani 
učinak tih čimbenika pruža snažan argument za buduću kontrolu predmeta Ureda EJT-a pred 
Sudom. Međutim osnovni zaključak koji se može izvući jest složenost i nesigurnost koji slijede. 
U pravilu, kad je riječ o poštovanju ljudskih prava u kaznenim predmetima, to nije poželjno ni 
prihvatljivo.
Ključne riječi: Europski sud za ljudska prava, Ured europskog javnog tužitelja, zaštita ljud-
skih prava
